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ABSTRAcr
Theinsights of descriptive decision theorists and
psychologists, we believe, have much to contribute to our
understanding of financial market macrophenomena. We propose an
analytic agenda that distinguishes those individual
idiosyncrasies that prove consequential at the macro-level from
those that are neutralized by market processes such as poaching.
We discuss five behavioral traits -barn-doorclosing,
expert/reliance effects, status quobias,framing, and herding -
thatwe employ in explaining financial flows. Patterns in flows
to mutual funds, to new equities, across national boundaries, as
well as movements in debt-equity ratios are shown to be
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Are financial markets efficient? Do their participants behave rationally? Does a positive
answer to the second question imply a positive answer to the first? And vice versa? These
remain open questions despite decades of effort by economists and numerous claims that the
issues have been resolved.
Financialmarkets areextremely competitive (with near-instantaneous price adjustments
and little room for strategic behavior), with virtually no externalities from participants'
actions. Under such conditions, individual rationality can aggregate to collectively efficient
outcomes. A body of work developing this view was honored by the Nobel Committee in
Economics when it awarded its 1990 prize to modem finance's pioneers, Harry Markowitz,
Merton Miller, and William Sharpe. But does this paradigm capture most financial market
behavior?
Clearly, some of the participants in financial markets do not act with perfect rationality;
that is, they make mistakes.' But more astute players stand ready to capitalize on their
mistakes — for example, to buy when panic leads to speculative market crashes, to extract I /8s
and l/4s from individuals who trade in and out in the mistaken belief that they can beat the
market, or to take positions to bring mispriced stocks into line. Given this sort of "poaching"
(which includes arbitrage), the collective outcome may be indistinguishable from the one that
would result if all participants behaved with perfect rationality.
Consequently, one might expect to find few instances of nonrational financial behavior at
aggregate levels. But then how can we account for speculative fads, from the Dutch tulip
mania of the seventeenth century to the rash of junk bonds in the 1980s (see Shiller, l989)?2
Equally puzzling is the crash of October 1987, which reduced the stock market's value by one-
third, although no significant bad news had broken. Such events hint that the rationality
paradigm may not be universally applicable, but since each case is unique in important
respects, their true cumulative significance is difficult to interpret.
Academic attempts to identify inefficient aggregate behavior, or to refute the assumption
of a rational representative agent, have focused predominantly on asset prices. Shiller' s (1981,
1For ourpurposes,a nonrationalorirrationalagent issimply one who differs from the neoclassicalhomo
economicusprototypecharacterized by Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility,optimal expectatIons. Bayesian
updatingrules for probability revision, and so on. The qualifier behavioral.' in our paper, is interchangeable with
"nonrational,'and carries no pejorative connotations.
2Bad overall outcomes can result fromgoodindividual choices aswell as from poor ones. In this spirit, the
economistexplains various undesirable social phenomena, from unemployment to traffic congestion. a,s collectively
suboptimal outcomes that result 1mm rational individual choices (Sehelling, 1978).-2-
1989) work, arguing that the equity prices are excessively volatile relative to dividend streams,
is a hotly debated example.3 In this paper, we focus instead on the evidence from financial
flows, which like asset prices are regular (not idiosyncratic) and therefore provide a usable
database. From a policy standpoint such flows are of vital concern since they represent the
investment patterns of our economy.4
We will argue that patterns in various types of flows — to mutual funds, to new equities,
across national boundaries — are consistent with deviations from rationality. The insights of
descriptive decision theorists and psychologists, we believe, have much to contribute to our
understanding of such financial market macrophenomena. We propose an analytic agenda that
distinguishes those individual idiosyncrasies that prove consequential at the macro-level from
those that are neutralized by market processes such as poaching.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section I sketches the current state of the efficient
markets paradigm, and contrasts it with behavioral phenomena relevant to the study of
financial market outcomes. Section 2 highlights selected empirical results that show these
behavioral factors at work. Section 3 discusses further applications of the behavioral approach
in finance, and section 4 concludes.
1. Behavioral foundations of financial macrophenomena
We focus on behavior as it is revealed in market outcomes, rather than approach our
subject through surveys or controlled experiments.6 One would expect financial market
outcomes to avoid certain kinds of nonrationality that might appear under experimental
conditions, because investors play for significant stakes and have sustained opportunities for
practice. In experimental markets that permit practice and significant payment, Camerer
(1987) has found that many anomalies vanish, although individuals continue to suffer from
3AIso see the anomalies columns in the JournalofEconomiLr Perpectiws jV0I. I, 1987, and subsequentissuesI.
and referencesinLeroy. 1989. section VII.
4The finance academy sheepishly acknowledges the relativelackof work on this topiC. For example. Ross (1989,
p. 94) admits that "there can be nothing more embarrassing to an economist than the ability to explain the price in
a market while being completely silent on the quantity." He suggests that the only way to explain the volume of
financial trade is with a model that, while rational, pennits divergent and changing opinions.
5Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks (1991a) briefly review a portion of the material discussed here.
6We sidestep the philosophical debate on whether models should be judged by the realism of their assumptions or
the accuracy of their predictions — for instance, see Friedman (1953) and the vast subsequent literature. In the
present context, this debate would focus on whether good models must make realistic assumptions about individual
behavior, or need only make accurate predictions about aggregate outcomes.-3-
representativeness bias (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982; Arrow, l982). Camerer
concludes that "a program of empirical work ... could establish what kinds of nonrationality
seem to persist under the incentives and learning opportunities present in natural markets.
Such data might lead to economic theory that uses evidence of systematic nonrationality to
make better predictions." We accept this challenge and ask: what decision-making biases
remain in operating financial markets, where payoffs are significant, poaching is frequently
possible, information is extensive and material, and most players participate repeatedly?
Section 1.1 briefly reviews the status of the efficient markets paradigm. In section 1.2,
we consider a typology of markets that sheds light on the conditions under which the model of
efficient markets may have to give way to behavioral explanations. In section 1.3, we discuss
four behavioral hypotheses, which are subsequently used to explain a range of selected
financial market flows.
1 .1 The efficient markets paradigm
Financial economists assess the efficiency of a market in terms of its ability to incorporate
relevant information, rather than to minimize transactions costs or to attain social welfare
desiderata such as Pareto efficiency. More exactly, a market is said to be efficient with
respect to an information set if no participant with access to that information can make
systematic excess returns. Note that this definition does not require that prices be a sufficient
statistic for the information. For example, individuals may need to spend resources to avail
themselves of the information8 impounded in prices in order to form optimal portfolios, even if
information acquisition costs can not be justified by the likelihood of discovering mispriced
assets.
An efficient market implies that there should be no arbitrage opportunities; that it, it
should not be possible to make a sure profit with a zero-risk zero-investment strategy. This
seemingly trifling condition led to interesting and empirically successful pricing relations for
7Therepresentativenessheuristic assignsprobability on the basis of similarity. ignoringrelevant information such
asbase rates (priorunconditionalprobabilities)and sample sizes.
811 individualscan learn jsers' informationbyobserving prices, that information willhavea publicgoods aspect;
too littleofitwillbe privatelyprovided.If securitiesmaybe mispriced.onthe other hand, there is a competitive
advantage in securinginformationnot possessed by others: too muchexpenditureson information may be a
consequence (1-lirshlcifer,1971).
9while simple models of financial marketequilibriumgenerate a universal optimal portfolio(the"market" portfolio
in the context of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, for instance),recent modelsthat sccommodate differences
between individual investors in the breadth of knowledge about assets imply optimal portfolios that must be
individually tailored—see Merton (l987a).-4-
derivative securities such as options and collateralized mortgage obligations, for which
arbitrage strategies entail complex dynamic trading. The celebrated Black-Scholes option
pricing formula spawned a large derivative asset-pricing industry, within which the lines
between academia and practice have blurred. No-arbitrage conditions pin down relative prices
(e.g., how the price of a call option on IBM shares should be linked to the share price).
Whether the price level of the share itself is correct is more difficult to establish, since a model
of equilibrium pricing must be invoked. Black (1986) — a pioneer of the efficient markets
model — observes that the empirical tests to date may not reject the market efficiency
hypothesis even if the price levels are off by a factor of 100%.
Of course, as Fama (1990) notes, "The market efficiency hypothesis is an extreme null
hypothesis, a point on a continuum, and so almost surely false. The interesting task is ... to
measure the extent to which behavior of returns departs from its predictions." After nearly
four decades of intensive empirical investigation of investment market prices, the gross
evidence generally supports the hypothesis — see recent surveys in Merton (1987b) and Fama
(1990). The evidence from firm behavior and the market for corporate control is more
controversial: witness the raging debates about whether junk bonds or hostile acquisitions
promote efficiency, and whether associated transaction prices are ex-ante appropriate. We
know that some cities fail to discount for time in choosing capital projects. And there are
myriad stories of firms making uncritical and incorrect use of weighted average cost-of-capital
figures in their capital budgeting.
The power of the market efficiency principle provoked ingenious efforts to explain
anomalies. These efforts yielded insights in agency theory, asymmetric information equilibria,
signaling, and game theory. Clearly, the field gained by maintaining an intuitively wise
organizing principle as a null hypothesis. Compare the similar success of the genetic-fitness
paradigm for evolutionary modeling, which spawned a vast literature on evolutionary
psychology (with ripple effects in philosophy and sociology))0
After the early battles in academia, the efficiency benchmark has become a valuable null
hypothesis for organizing lessons and studies about financial behavior. Models that purport to
violate this principle have to be explicitly articulated and subjected to rigorous testing.
Unfortunately, many studies placed such a large prior probability on the market efficiency
hypothesis that falsifying findings were almost precluded. For example, the academic
consensus about exchange rates is that they are uncorrelated and unpredictable. Nevertheless
sophisticated speculators and technical advisors claim to consistently observe and take
°See Dawkins(1976) onthe genetic fithesprinciple,which shares Overtoneswiththe rational selfishness
principle in neoclassical economics and methodological individualism in sociology. Dupn (1987) has edited a
more recent collection of related essays.-5-
advantage ofsubtlenonlinear patterns — see Goodman (1982), Engel and Hamilton(1990),
and Bilson (1990). Finally, the problem of joint hypothesis testing has led to some tests that
have very low power to reject plausible deviations from market efficiency. A priori faith in
the power of no-arbitrage has probably clouded the common sense recognition that human
errors might persist or even compound rather than cancel each other.
Nonetheless the efficient markets hypothesis provides a natural benchmark, and thus
financial markets are a promising arena in which to investigate deviations from rational
behavior. The research is facilitated by the facts that financial markets are liquid, and
individual motivations are relatively straightforward, in accord with wealth-maximizing
hypotheses (possibly modified by risk aversion). Moreover, the operation of these markets is
thoroughly recorded, with rich price and volume data readily available.
1.2 Typology of markets
The nonrational behaviors of individuals, although well documented, may not be apparent at
the market level because many financial markets offer poaching potential (that is, players can
take advantage of poor decisions made by others). More generally, aggregate social outcomes
reflect both prevailing levels of individual rationality and opportunities for poaching, as table 1
shows schematically. Poachability will play an important role in determining which macro
outcomes we study to draw inferences about levels of individual rationality.














to restore efficiency (see
Table 2).
IV. Gross behavioral
outcomes (e.g., marriages —
poor fits frequent; bargains
— beneficial deals not struck;
finance — inadequate
personal savings).-6-
When individuals are rational and there are many opportunities for arbitrage, we expect
the efficientmarkets paradigmto be dominant (cell I in Table I). At the other extreme (cell
IV) behavioral models should provide a better description of aggregate outcomes. For
example, because of long lead times, poor institutional planning, and individual failures of
foresight, we observe cycles of excess- and under-production of teachers. The situation is akin
to the corn-hog cycle familiar to economists, with the crucial difference that in the agricultural
arena, futures markets facilitate an efficient smoothing of suboptimal swings. Many of the
least happy areas of human activity fall into cell IV. The mischosen marriage partner or
poorly fitting job is prototypical. So too are patterns of preferences—such as excessive
attention to one's relative as to opposed to one's absolute position—that are inconsistent with
what we normally assume for rationality. For example, the inadequate levels of personal
savings in the United States may be due to excessive competition in consumption levels, as a
means to signal one's status (Frank, 1985).
Cell IV is also the sad domain where many an advantageous exchange is not made,
perhaps because of greed or desire to do better than the other party, or merely because of the
intractability of bargaining. One of the undersung virtues of the market is that by putting
many participants on each side of bargaining situations, it defines the way the surplus from
striking a deal should be divided, and thereby avoids costly impasses. Thus market outcomes
establish a price for carrots; as buyers we accept it when it is below our reservation price, or
else move on to the rutabaga stand, without wasting our time trying to cajole the carrot seller
into lowering his price.
It is in cells II and III that a merger of behavioral considerations and economic market
analysis can be most fruitful. In situations that are characterized by low poachability but in
which rational choice conditions predominate (cell H), we expect economic paradigms to
succeed, albeit with behavioral residues leading to periodic observable anomalies (see section
2). For example, if most drivers are rational, we would expect them to choose the most
economical route for commuting. This assumption is fruitfully invoked in transport models
even though rational commuter A can not derive any advantage for herself from (poach upon)
misguided B whose "shortcut" adds 10 minutes to his trip. Even if individuals are fully
rational, they may not possess all relevant information, and those with superior information
may not be able to capitalize upon it. Thus, open-end mutual funds can sell at inappropriate
prices, and firms with market power may produce inappropriate products. Rationality, by
itself, provides little guidance as to what outcomes are appropriate, If it did, the participants
would immediately gravitate to such outcomes.
The expected patterns for situations corresponding to cell Ill depend crucially on the
dynamics of the situation and the magnitude of flows that nonrational participants bring to the-7-
market)' (See table 2.) If, as we suspect, many financial market participants are less than
perfectly rational, their actions will be well camouflaged in aggregate Statistics by the poaching
activities of better-informed, more rational, and ultimately richer participants.
Cell Ill is of particular interest for financial markets. Processes of natural selection
underlie its operation. If rational poachers are large relative to the market, they will quickly
restore rational aggregate outcomes. Thus, for example, it is widely accepted that one can not
make money speculating on major New York Stock Exchange securities on the basis of
publicly available information. Indeed, this very feature—the appropriateness of prices—
protects small, possibly nonrational investors whose stock purchases may be guided by
astrology, a worthless technical system, or mere whim. (They lose something nevertheless:
the transactions costs of buying and selling.)
Table2. Detailing Cell III: Sinai!, Low-Rationality Paiidprnts
in Ma,*e1 inth Poaching
Inflows of small,low-rationality participants
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If a sustained flow of resources from nonrational investors is large enough, it may push a
market away from a rational equilibrium for long periods of time. Indeed, nonrational
investor psychology may defeat the efforts of rational poachers, who generally work on
borrowed money and high leverage; they can not wait forever for markets to come to
rational/fundamental equilibrium)2 The short-term speculator who knows long-term
tBounded rationalityissubstantially different from full rationality with regard to information acquisition and
processing costs — see Simon (1957) for discussion of procedural rationality (consistent with bounded rational
behavior) versus substantive rationality.
'2Consider an investor who, in the mid-1980s, conectly realized that that a PIE ratio of 40 for Japanese equities
was unsustainably high. By acting on this belief (i.e., shorting the Japanese equity market) the investor would
have 14)5* money eveIy year from 1985 to 1989. Finally in 1990. it still able and willing to persist in his faith, he-8-
equilibrium values wants to have a reasonable number of naive speculators in the market, but
not an excess.
When poachers are small relative to the market, they may be able to profit for sustained
periods of time; eventually their prosperity will change the balance and the push toward
rational aggregate outcomes will accelerate. In the 1960s and early l970s, before option
pricing formulas became widely known and accepted, it was relatively easy for mathematically
oriented traders to make profits on American options exchanges)3
If poachers are small and new nonrational market participants flow in continuously, there
may be sustained periods of inefficiency. In certain markets, moreover, even dispassionate
experts may have little guidance as to appropriate prices. Examples include the market for
gold, which is driven predominantly by speculative expectations rather than by fundamental
forces of demand in use, or the market for oil, whose performance depends on a quirky
oligopoly and idiosyncratic international events (witness the price gyrations during Kuwait's
takeover by Iraq and the subsequent Gulf War). Many commodity futures markets may also
fall into this category.
Not all financial markets offer equal poaching potential. Open-end mutual funds, for
example, cannot be sold short. Portfolio balances (observed as flows) and adjustments are also
not directly poachable. We provide some selective evidence in the next section on such funds
and flows. Moreover, as Thaler and Ziemba (1988) show, poaching does not necessarily
eliminate irrational pricing even in places where we might expect it to do so: the markets for
place and show bets at racetracks are inefficient (in the sense of offering opportunities for
profit), despite the presence of many willing arbitrageurs)4 Similarly, Lee et al. (1991) report
behaviorally driven premiums and discounts for closed-end mutual funds, which are traded on
stock exchanges like common stocks, and are poachable.
would have been rewarded by catchingthe roughly 40% faIlinthe Tokyo Stock Exchange that broughtits PIE
ratiodownfrom over 50 to30(which is still exceedingly high by U.S.standards).
'3By the 1980s the game had becomemuchharder. Machines available on exchanges printed out 'scientifically
determined' values for options. In addition, dozens of professional bridge players, whose principal skill may be
rapid rational decision under short-termuncertainly,flooded the exchanges and diminished the returns to other
floor traders and poachers.
14ALSO, the favorite-longshot hiss leaves a positive expected value for racetrack betting on odds of 3-10 or below.
strategy of investing in closed-end hinds that trade atdeepdiscounts (20% or greater) relative to net asset
value generates positive excess returns.-9-
1.3 Behavioral Hypotheses
Financial markets can be viewed as an ecosystem, populated by rational and nonrational
investors. Depending on their relative numbers, and the ability of the first group to capitalize
on the errors of the second, equilibria with varying qualitative features will arise. Generations
of economists have refined a well-specified theory of the way rational participants will behave.
Nonrational participants, however, come in many different species.
Behavioral hypotheses can be introduced into the study of financial markets in a range of
ways. For example, one might pose explicit behavioral hypotheses about individual activities
and then invoke the usual economic method for aggregation and market clearing — as Shefnn
and Statman (1989) do in developing a prospect-theoretic model of capital asset pricing. Or
one might conjecture that outcomes arise as if from a single representative agent endowed with
nonrational chan,cteristics. The latter approach provides a suitable framework for preliminary
investigation to predict patterns substantially different from the rational choice paradigm.
We discuss four behavioral hypotheses, variants of which are found within the
mainstream psychological literature, for explaining some aggregate features of financial
markets:'6
I. Barn door closing. Barn door closing, in the horse protection sense, refers to
undertaking behavior today that would have been profitable yesterday. Investors seek to
reproduce actual or imagined past investment successes by investing today in the same way.
(When the current strategy is to continue an actual past strategy, it is often called "riding the
winners.") In efficient markets, by contrast, prevailing asset prices capture all rational
expectations about future prospects; it is impossible to identify profitable strategies. If this
behavioral trait is significant, investors might be slow to re-enter the stock market after a
plunge (e.g., the 1987 crash'7), and foreign investors might withhold investment flows to the
United States after periods in which the dollar depreciated rapidly.
160fcounie. transactions costs and impediments to arbitrage (essentially nonbehavioral explanations) may he
sufficient to cause deviations from financial market efficiency. For example. ii institutions are prohibited from
trading or offering securities overseas, then cross-border assets may not be tightly related to each other — see
Oultekin ci at. (1989) and references therein.
Our hypotheses are illustrative. Many other behavioral tendencies identified in laboratory situations should be
tested in the cauldron of financial markets, where the stakes are big and most players are long-term participants.
'71n early 1990, NYSE telephone surveys found investors less likely in invest in stocks than they had been three
years earlier, with investors specifically citing the 1987 crash as a key reason (Ar1r1 Volstilityandfnseslor
Confidence, Reportto the Board of Directors of the New YorkStockExchange. Inc., 1990).- 10-
2. Exoerl and RelianceEffects.Anexperteffect(i.e., overemphasizingthe field you
understand best; Heath and Tversky, 1990) could explain the lack of international
diversification even by professionals whospecialize in assetclasses.
Complementing the expert effect infinancialmarkets is a reliance effect: decision
makers often rely on the advice of individuals with expert knowledge, even though using the
expert is costly andthereis no proof that such reliance will produce better outcomes. Thus,
despite meager evidence that experts can outperform the stock market, investors hesitate to
rely on their own judgment in selecting a portfolio. Instead they pay experts handsomely for
managing their funds. The extraordinary success of the mutual fund industry illustrates the
reliance phenomenon at work. Despite a modest overall performance record, consistent with
efficientmarkets, the mutual fund industry has grown spectacularly since the early 1970s; by
1988, there weremore mutual funds(over 2700) than there werestockson the NYSE.
3, Status Oup Bias. Investors tend to stickwith strategies because ofa reluctance to
depart from the statusquo,awidelyobservedhumantendency (Samuelsonand Zeckhauser,
1988).Statusquobiasmaybe promotedbyrelianceonrules of thumb,whichis an outgrowth
ofbounded rationality. Reinforced by experteffects,status quo bias may deter individuals
from investing in areasbeyondtheirexpertise.MostU.S.investors, for example, are
reluctant to hold significant positionsin non-U.S. securities despiteprospective gains in
diversification. Status quo bias is also stimulated by concerns about regret, which tend to
make errors of omission (failing to sell a stock that later goes down) much less serious than
errors of commission(sellinga stockonlyto seeit perform spectacularly))9A period of
learning how to function in changing financial markets —apattern not acknowledged in
conventional finance theory —couldalso explainstatusquo bias.2°
4. Illusions. Framing, and Data Packagin2. Since U.S. investors deal mainly in dollar
transactions, theymay not pay enoughattentionto exchange rate fluctuationsandtheir implied
ISOverthe past five years.only45 or so of the 1100fundsfollowed by Schahacker investesent Management have
bettered the S&P 500'sannualizedreturn.
'9Status quo bias would be rationallyreinforcedby transactions costs incurred in getting outofa position
(brokerage fees, exit charges, and taxes).
20Most United Statesinvestors,for example. may not know how to go about investing in Japan, though that market
is now open. Indeed, the economic Costs of investing directly on the Tokyo exchange are small. Thus if the
Japanese stocks that issue ADRs in the United States, or the U.S. stocks that are traded on the Tokyo Exchange,
turn out to have much higher levels of cross ownership, that might be considered evidence for a learning factor
contributing to status quo bias. However, the causality may run the other way: ADRs may be made available
specifically for those stocks that are desired by foreign investors.— II —
consequences; this would be a framing error.2' Similarly, investors with international holdings
may not fully understand the consequences of exchange rates. When the franc doubles against
the dollar, the rational investor should double the amount of incremental dollar-flows directed
to franc-denominated assets, but this requires an appreciation of exchange-rate effects on
optimum portfolio weights. Another variant of exchange-rate illusion arises when investors
conclude that certain currencies are weak or strong, beyond what is implied by interest rate
parity or exchange rate futures prices. Finally, the framing of data in the media (data-
packaging) will affect the relations between ultimate variables (flows and prices) and their
proximate causes.
2. Observed Behavioral Traits in Financial Markets
This section reports on empirical evidence in favor of the behavioral hypotheses outlined
above. We focus first on incremental flows to open-end mutual funds. (It is fortunate for the
mutual fund industry that, despite the efficient markets paradigm, the typical individual
investor believes winners can be identified on the basis of some combination of marketing
materials, investment philosophies, and evidence on past performance.) We also discuss
investment flows, both to U.S. equities and across national borders.
2.1 Holdings in and flows to mutual funds
If financialmarketsprice assets efficiently, why do many individuals invest through
professionally managed funds even though they must pay fees, and uncontrollably realize
capital gains that are subject to tax? Neither average returns nor reduction of risk justifies this
strategy. For example, 20 judicious individual-stock purchases would give reasonable
diversification. We made a rough calculation of the returns to four buy-and-hold strategies
over the 13-yearperiod1975—1987, involving funds and individual securities (table 3). One
strategy (a) is to randomly select a no-load growth fund from a sample of 96 such funds.
Three alternative homemade buy-and-hold strategies were considered by taking equally
2Ig Kahneman and Tversky (1986).
PopuIarpublicationssuch as Money or Forbes rarely pointout howeasily one can diversiti. Most financial
publications carty detailed rankings of mutual fund performance, but virtually no comparisons with stock portfolios
chosenat random. Fabled money manager Peter Lynch. in his recent book One Up On Y.1IStreef(l989), has
suggested that individuals should purchase individual stocks on the basis of personal expertise,sayabout the
companys products. Though perhaps working against diversification, such a strategy might give investors
sufficientconfidence to invest for themselves.
See Hendricks, Paid, and Zcckhauser (1990) for the eSact sample and its adequate representativeness.- 12-
weightedpositions in 20 stocks randomly selected from the 100 largest NYSE stocksand 100
bottom-decile NYSEstocks.Strategy (b) consists of positions in 10 bigand10 smallstocks.
Strategy (c) involves only small stocks, while strategy (ci) involves only big stocks.
Table 3. Buy-and-Hold Peffonnance:
MutualFundcve,us Home-madePortfolio
Strategy Mean Returns Standard Deviation
ofMean Returns
(a) No-load growthmutualfund(96selections) 16.1% 5.1%
(b) Portfoliosof10 big stocks& 10 smallstocks (10
simulations)
19.6% 2.6%
(c) Portfotio of20 smallstocks(5simulations) 23.3% 3.5%
(d) Portfolio of20bigstocks(5simulations) 14.3% 1.6%
In table 3, both strategies containing small stocks (b and c) produce a higher mean
return than a random mutual fund as well as reduced uncertainty in expected outcome, as the
standard deviations suggest. These results support the view that mutual fund ownership offers
negligible diversification gains over easy homemade portfolios. Also the active "experts
management of mutual funds evidently ledtoa wider divergence of overall performance than
would have resulted from a passive random allocation of funds among stocks. That individuals
rely so heavily on mutual funds —despitethe ease of diversification in a personal portfolio,
the widespread discussion of efficient markets, and (frequently) personal evidence that their
fund has underperforrned the market —indicates,in our belief, the importance of the reliance
phenomenon.
In the rational framework, the annual flows across funds from year to year are puzzling
too. Markowitz (1952, 1959) and Sharpe (1964) address the rational portfolio choice problem
and its implications for market pricing and efficient portfolio decisions. Their models imply
that the optimal mix of asset holdings should be the same for all individuals, namely pro-
portional to the total market values of the securities.24 When combined with the efficient
markets hypothesis (Fama, 1970), this view leads to a passive (i.e., nontrading) portfolio
strategy. If all investors followed this strategy, observed flows should display no patterns and
should be due entirely to liquidity/consumption needs or incremental savings.
24The recently introduced multifactor Arhitrae Pricing Theory (APT) is no more successfulthanthe CAPMin
explainmg mvestor (lows. Moreover, the factors that APT posits to underlie security pricing remain to be
identified, though Chen. Roll, and Ross (1986) have made a tirst cut at this important task.- 13-
Wehypothesize, in contrast, that flows to open-end mutual funds may reflect status quo
bias, framing,anddata-packaging. The strength of status quo bias can be assessed by
examining flow persistence over time and the relationship of flows to fund size. Although
learning costs may justify a modicum of persistence, the opportunity costs of persistent
behavior are often high enough to warrant an investment in self-education. The main cause of
persistence seems more likely to lie in such phenomena as regret avoidance —anattempt to
avoid a mistaken act of commission, such as selling a fund that goes up subsequently.
The framing/data-packaging conjecture is consistent with psychological evidence that
people follow simple rules based on direct evidence available to them. Not surprisingly,
mutual fund performance rankings are compiled on a regular and timely basis, and are widely
followed. Mutual funds that do relatively well tout their performance prominently in their
advertising. Those that don't, seareh for the measure that puts them in the best possible light.
With some caveats, the investment advisory literature advocates investing in top-ranking
performers. The data-packaging effect can be studied by comparing the effects on flows of (a)
widely reported ranks, and (b) cardinal measures of absolute or risk-adjusted
performance,which are preferable from the standpoint of financial theory but may not be easily
understood.
Consider table 4, which is based on Patel, Zeckhauser and Hendricks (1991b, tables 2
and 3).- 14-
Table4. Explaining Annual Flous to Open-End No-Load Gmt.lJi
Mutual Funds: .96 fum'k during 1976-1987
Regression: FIow1t =+ j31Flow111+$2Size1,t_i+/33ReIurnti{+ /34Ranktt +

















Notes: Size' is the dollar value of the fund. Fiow is the change in the size of the fund (MM$) after correcting
for fluctuating values of the assets in which the fund is invested (but net of dividends declared by the fund in the
period). "Return is the realizable return to an investor who buys the fund at the beginning of the period and sells
it at the end of the period, i.e., total asset return perfonnance of the fund (inclusive of capital gains and dividends)
but net of management fees and expenses. Rank is an ordinal measure constructed from Retum". The
regression is estimated using feasible generalized least squares (GLS), which allows for different error variances
between years. Here i-statistics are in parentheses. R2 is the usual measure of proportion of variance in dependent
variable that is explained by the regression after degrees-of-freedom correction.is the estimate of the first-order
autocorrelation of the residuals; it is always small and suggests that the regression adequately captures time-
dependencies.
The results strongly confirm the expected associations.About three-quartersofthe cross-
sectionaltime-series variation in annual flows (96 funds over 1976-87) can be explained by
four main patterns:
1. Status quo bias (persistence): other things equal, a one-dollar flow in the past year implies a
75 cent flow in this period.
2. Status quo bias (size): being one dollar bigger in size at the beginning of the period induces
a 5 cent increased flow.
3. Past performance: a return I % above the cross-sectional mean return in the previous period
implies a $200,000 increased flow in this period. (The median fund in the sample held
approximately $80 million in assets and grew by $5 million per period.)
4. Effects of data packaging: rank measures, which are widely reported, appear to be more
relevant in explaining flow patterns than quantitative performance measures.
Why might investors rely on past performance? Perhaps, following Tversky and
Kahneman (1971), investors expect the properties of large samples, such as convergence of
relative frequency to population parameters, to hold in small samples too: that is, they tend to
generalize too readily from small samples, or incorrectly infer autocorrelated performance
from observed runs in mutual fund returns that actually arise from random walk processes. A
more straightforward justification follows from the results of Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser- 15-
(1990), who report significantexcess returns of 1-2% per quarter from selecting the open-end
mutualfund that performed best in the previous quarter. (This result,initself, is inconsistent
with the efficient market hypothesis).2'
Aggregate flows fromthehousehold sector to mutual funds also have behavioral
features. If the barn-door-closing hypothesis is germane, individuals will buy more mutual
funds after the stock market goes up, and sell after it plunges. Further, if there is some
behavioral threshold effect, this reaction will manifest itself mainly for large changes.
Consider the fraction, f, of the U.S. household sector's flow of financial purchases (composed
of direct and intermediated net purchases of equities, bonds, and short-maturity or demand
deposits) directed to mutual funds. Quarterly data on f are constructed from the Federal Flow
of Funds for the 1952Q1-l990Ql period and exclude households' indirect claims, such as pen-
sions.
Table 5 reports on a regression of f on four of its own lags, returns on the equity market
(as proxied by the value-weighted NYSE index), and changes in yields from investing in
Treasury bills.
These results, however, do not restore a rational explanation for the flows' dependence on past performance
ranks, since the optimal strategy is to select only the top performers and shift investments away from all other
funds. Also, the observed persistence in flows to funds is now identified with opportunity costs of failing to
switch.Further, sincepredictable underperfomers do attract substantial funds, there are evidently some overpriced
managers in the financial marketplace, and some less than fully rational mutual-fund buyers arenot protectedby
overallmarket efficiency. In sum, although there are rational grounds to justify active management of fund
purchases, the actual aggregate behavior is. at best, rational in limited aspects.- 16-
Table5. Exaining the U.S. household Sector's Qua,ferly Purchases
of Mutual Funds (as a Fnicllon of Direct and Inte,rne(Eated Net Purchases of
Equities, Bonds, and Shoz1-Matusiy or Deniaudl)epsitc th,iing 1952-89)
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Notes: 'R' is the return on the equity market (as proxied by the value-weighted NYSE index). Rbig'
(RsmaIl') includes only equity returns that are greater (smaller) than 10% in absolute value, and is zero otherwise.
'M' is the change in the quarterly return that is realizable by rolling over I-month Treasury bills. 'Mbig'
('slsma1l') includes only changes in I that are greater (smaller) than 0.25% in absolute value, and is zero
otherwise.
Here I-statistics are in parentheses. R2 is the usual measure of proportion of variance in dependent
variable that is explained by the regression after degrees-of-freedom correction. The second regression, with
decomposed returns, finds that only large returns have significant effects on net household flow purchases of
mutual funds. Tests for autocorrelated errors, not reported, do not indicate any misspecification of the estimated
regression.
In thefirstrow of the table, we observe an economically large andstatistically
significantpositivecoefficient, 35 in the base regression, on equity returns,whichis consistent
withbarndoor closing.(Simultaneityproblems are avoidedsincemost mutualfundsare open
end, and hence their supplyof sharesishighlyelastic.)When themarkethas done well, one
wishes that one had invested there, rather thanpurchaseshort-term assets(whichnormally
representmorethan 50% of thehouseholds'flows)and fixed-interestassets (which represent
about21%), andvice-versa. Afterthe fact,one makes suchinvestments. The second rowof
Table 5 reportson a regressionthatdecomposes quarterly equity returns intolarge (>10% I)
andsmall changes.We observea thresholdeffect: onlylarge changes matter, a further
indicationofnonrationalorbounded rationalbehavior.26
26Specitically. a I % change in equity returns beyond a threshold change of 10% induces a 6% change in the rate
of investment in mutual funds by households. (The results are not restricted to a particular suhperiod; of the 25
large-change observations. 10 are from the 1950s and 1960s, and 15 are from the 1970s and l980s.)- 17-
2.2 Net Flows into Equities and Transnational flows
These behavioral approaches can be extended to explain the flows of net new issues of equities
as a percentage of GNP, We conjecture that the issuance of equities is at least partly driven by
nonrational traits of participants. Again, we posit status quo biases and expert and reliance
effects on the market. (Firmmanagersrely on investment bankers who try to issue equities
when market conditions are "good," though with efficient markets this is an impossibility.)
Empirical studies of security flows have typically assumed rational behavior on the part
of all market participants. Studies of the supply and demand for long-term bonds (Friedman,
1977 and 1979) have posited structural equations that are linear in expected returns and
homogeneous in wealth. Such a specification implies, however, a separation of the
investment-consumption decision and the portfolio allocation decision. This assumption is
implausible with regard to the supply of financial assets, since casual observation suggests the
presence of boom-and-bust cycles in corporate security issuance.
We examine the evidence on the net flow of funds to equity markets (new issues less
repurchases in constant dollars) by the non financial corporate sector of the United States
during the period 1953-1984. Our particular concern is whether firms that issue equities seek
to identify times when they can realize a relatively high price for new stock, implying that they
reject the efficient markets hypothesis.
Consider the regression of net equity flows on (i) lagged equity flow; and level of and
most recent change in (ii) dividend yield based on the Standard and Poor's 500 portfolio
(inversely related to cost of the issue for pre-issue shareholders), (iii) vector of interest rates
(proxy for cost of bond substitute), (iv) internal cash flows (readily available alternative), and
(v) capital expenditures (proxy for need for funds). The well-fitting regression (numerical
estimates not shown) explains 60% of the time-series variation in net equity flows. The
significant marginal relations are the following: a positive partial correlation with own lag; a
negative partial correlation with own cost; and a negative partial correlation with cost of bond
substitutes. The latter two relations are consistent with attempts by firms to issue equity when
market conditions are favorable.
An efficient-markets explanation for the correlation between market conditions and new
equity flows can be proposed: the flow of prospective positive net-present-value projects
increases in periods when security market conditions are good, which induces an increase in
security issues to raise needed funds to invest in such periods. Assuming that the capital
expenditure in the regression equation is not an adequate proxy for projects' needs, the net
effect is to generate the observed marginal correlations. However the case for the simpler
behavioral explanation — that issuers believe they can identify windows of opportunity (in
violation of the efficient markets hypothesis) — is reinforced by corroborating evidence from- 18-
other markets.Kim and Stulz (1988) document bond issue timing between domestic and
Eurobondmarkets; Lee, Shleifer,andThaler (1991) document timing of closed-end fund
issues; and Ritter(1991)documents timing of initial public offerings of equity.
We have explored a supply-side phenomenon in the flow of funds. What can we learn
about demanders? In particular, how do overseas investors choose their levels of investment in
U.S.securities? Forexample, many commentators have attributed the much-remarked jump
inJapanese purchases circa 1984 tothe relaxation of Japanese governmentrules limiting
foreign purchases by Japaneseinstitutions.In this case aknown pdlicy changehasled usto
look foritseffects within financial markets, a form of availability bias.
Unfortunately,thisJapan-orientedtheoryis undermined by data onother international
investors. Figure 1, forexample, contrastsU.S. security purchasesfrom theUnited Kingdom
and Canada with those ofJapan.Britishand Canadian investors began to boost their U.S.
holdings at the same time asJapaneseinvestors. We observe that theories andexplanations are
themselvessubject to anavailabilityhypothesis.27 It appearsthat some more general
phenomenonrelating to the U.S. market itself is required for a robust explanation of these
transnationalflows.
3. Fields for Exploration
Looking predominantly at flows of funds, a relatively unexplored area, we have
documentednonrational behavior in financial markets. A fleetofadditionalbehavioral
anomalies have been identifiedinthe psychology literature.Dothey too appear in financial
markets? A systematic investigation of this question could proceed in threedirections: (1)
assessmentof behavior in financial markets, seeking evidence of anomalies documented in
other realms; (2) empirical testing of models of nonrational behavior, and (3) attempts to
explain observed phenomena that seem inconsistent with rational behavior assumptions, and
shed light on nonrational behaviors. The first path has been illustrated in the previous
sections. The second and third are considered below in our discussions of herd behavior and
the survival of financial markets respectively.
3.1 Herd Behavior: Model and evidence from debt-equity ratios
In addition to the four behavioral traits discussed earlier, we posit that flows in financial
markets are influenced by herd behavior — a tendency to incline actions to some group norm.
Such clustering of behavior is well known in clothes fashions or recreational activity, such as
27The availabilityheuristic assessesprobability by recalling similar occurrences fromon&savailable store of
memories, which leads to biasesrelatedto retrievability of instances and imaginahility.- 19 -
newly popular mountain biking. There would seem, however, to be little justification for
clustering fads in financial markets. Presumably, each decision-maker is choosing for himself,
and there is no explicit cost associated with being away from others. But we shall argue, first
theoretically and then with suggestive empirical evidence, that commonality in actions is
significant.
At least three different effects tend to produce herding behavior:
(a) Free-riding in information acquisition. Some individuals, by luck or skill or effort, will
obtain superior information on which they can act. Less advantaged individuals will mimic
the actions of others who they believe are better informed. Recent models in this vein
include those of Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) and Scharfstein and Stein (1990).
(b) Protection from being close to the group. The agency paradigm emphasizes that agents
(e.g., managers acting on behalf of shareholders) often know more about their own tastes,
abilities, and actions than the principal does. Under such conditions of asymmetric
information, it may be efficient to make payoffs to agents that are based on their reIatie
performances.In such a scenario, agents may find it advantageous to herd, particularly if
they are risk averse.28
(c) Fundamental preference-level concern with group norms. For example, if outcomes are
poor, the costs of self-reproach may be greater if one has "stepped out" on one's own, away
from the group.
These factors may have nonrational underpinnings. We suspect that in many situations
individuals overestimate the information possessed by others, not recognizing the covariance of
all players' ignorance. (A good recent example was provided by investors in Rhode Island
who maintained large accounts in local banks, which faced serious prospects of nonperforming
assets and were backed by an insurance agency of dubious means, simply because nobody else
withdrew their funds. They jointly realized painful outcomes when deposits were frozen at the
beginning of 1991.)
Consider a decision maker who is concerned about how his action affects his self-image,
or the ways others perceive and will reward him. An additional component of utility, well
established in the behavioral literature, captures a concern about matters such as regret.
Regret in the traditional literature derives from choosing an action that is revealed to be
28Beyond risk and return, individualsresponsible foruniversityendowments,betheyportfolio managers or boards
of trustees, are likelytoconsider how they perform relative to competitor endowments. Portfolios are likely to be
tilted toward somecommonallocation and away from the efficiency frontier. Stanfords endowment managers
may thus worry about their holdings relative to Flarvard's.andvice versa (Jack Meyer, President, Harvard
Management Company, personal conversation, 3/12/91). Leading American universities, for example, appear to
underinvest in foreign equities as a group. Many individual managers may recognize this missed opportunity hut
may be hesistant to step out of line.- 20-
inferior given the state of the world that later turns out to prevail. Our hypothesis is that a
more complex measure of regret is needed, because the actor cares about the choices of other
players confronted with roughly the same decision problem. For any given loss, regret is
tempered when others have made a greater mistake ex post, and augmented when one would
have done better by acting more like others: one sees oneself as less blameworthy for a poor
outcome if one has taken roughly the same action that others took in equivalent circumstances.
Attending to such concern will draw together the actions of individuals who are commonly
situated. Thus we should expect to see herding when players have preference functions with
other-regarding regret. Herding would also be expected in situations where falling below an
external norm, say on how hard a professor should work, imposes severe losses in self-regard
or external attitudes.
A prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) like phenomenon may apply as well,
with further implications for herding. Rising above the norm gains less than is lost by an
equal deviation below, and further rises offer diminishing benefit. Where adherence to the
norm is likely to be a binding constraint on many participants, we should expect to see many
players very close to the norm, not seeking to rise above it. Moreover, falling below the
reference point — in this case the group norm — imposes a diminishing marginal cost, and
those who do fall below might do so significantly.
If actions are uncoordinated, particularly if players' situations differ, the group norm
will be fuzzy. In such circumstances the group norm will exert less pull, and individual
behavior will be less responsive to social factors. Other things being equal, herding behavior
should be less common in situations where group norms are ill-defined or nonexistent.
For illustrative evidence on herd behavior in financial markets, consider the annual ratios
of debt (book value) to equity (market value) for the 200 largest U.S. firms (by sales) during
the period 1971-89. Presumably, this choice of the debt-to-equity ratio represents a careful
weighing of the prospects of higher returns from leverage against the desire to be prudent.
On the COMPUSTATdatabase,15 of these firms had some missing observations, and three
clearly had outlier debt/equity ratios (in excess of five); this left us with a usable sample of
182 firms. We assigned firms to 10 industries based on a classification by two-digit SIC
codes.
We investigated the herd migration explanation by regressing the firm's debt-equity ratio
on two own lags and one lag of the industry ratio. (The expected industry ratio is proxied by
29The literature on the detenninants of capital structurechoicehas mushroomedinthe lastdecade, with recent
models drawingon agency theuty. asymmetries in information, corporate control contests,andso on. See Hams
and Raviv(1991)for anexcellentsurvey.Wedo not control for the competing explanations in our exploratoty
investigation.- 21-
its lagged value; its contemporaneous value may exhibit a positive relation simply because of
common shocks that influence the market value of equity across firms in an industry.)
A herd migration tendency for a firm is indicated by a significant positive sign, a t-
statistic > 2, on the industry ratio. Figure 2 summarizes the distribution of the t-statistics of
firms grouped by industry in the form of box-plots. The heavy horizontal line at the center of
each box-plot represents the median of the distribution; the box includes the central 50% of the
distribution.30 We observe that the coefficients are positive and several are significant (t-
statistic above 2.0), more than half for food and tobacco, paper, and oil and gas.3! The
median t-statistic is never significantly below 1.0; moreover six out of ten industry medians
are not significantly below 2.0.
The evidence suggests that corporate executives determining debt/equity ratios are
strongly influenced by the choices of their peers within the industry. Three reasons may be
posited: (1) decision makers gain information from what similar firms are doing; (2) they
secure protection from criticism (including self-criticism); (3) participants on the other side of
the market (such as lending institutions or the buyers of new issues) are engaging in herd
behavior, thereby inducing observed clustering among participants on this side.
3.2 Survival of Financial Markets
Future investigations should also proceed in the opposite direction, starting with puzzling
phenomena within financial markets and attempting to identify the types of behaviors that
could produce them. Consider futures markets, in which speculators account for the
overwhelming volume of business. For almost thirty years it has been recognized, as the Wall
Street Journal recentlyunderscored in a recent special supplement on futures markets, that the
typical small speculator loses more than 20% of his stake annually. What induces small
speculators to participate despite such unfavorable odds? An ecological metaphor askswhat
willenable such markets to survive, since they are expensive to operate, and their outcomes
are highly unfavorable to many participants, who have the option of placing their moniesback
instocks and bonds (Zeckhauser and Niederhoffer, 1983). The survival puzzle goesdeeper:
30me vertical lines extending beyondthe boxare drawn to the outermost values up to the median 1.5 X box-
height. Each outtier beyond (only paper in our saniple) is indicated by a circle.
31The angled sides of the box (notches) enable comparison of medians: informally, the medians are dtfferent if the
angled sides do not overlap.-22-
not only must small speculators systematically lose money; their resources and/or their ranks
must continually be replenished.32
We conjecture that financial markets must offer prospective expected losers the abilityto
convince themselves that they could (should) have made the right choices had they tried
harder, or that they will be able to do so in advance in the future. An appropriate metaphor is
the widespread American activity of Monday morning quarterbacking: fans of professional
football believe by Monday (with the unacknowledged benefit of hindsight) that they would
have been better able than their team to identify the strategy that would have won the Sunday
game. To confirm the general pervasiveness of Monday morning quarterbacking, the reader
should ask finance-oriented friends whether they realized that the stock market was overpriced
in October 1987, shortly before the worldwide crash.
Individuals who can delude themselves into thinking they could have made money given
past market behavior. may then act on that delusion by trading securities in contexts where
they will now be losers on average. In retrospect, such individuals can rationalize past losses
by pointing to a couple of missed trades that they "should have" undertaken. Moreover,
participants can construct quasi-scientific underpinnings to trading strategies. If the trader
ignored the Agriculture Department's fall report on soybeans, which ex-post proved to predict
price movements, he will "know better" next year. (In much the same way, social scientists
may offer ingenious justifications for modifications that rescue failed models.) Delusion is
required, for if the individuals were accurate in forecasting their prospects — a loss, on
average — they would withdraw money from the markets, and the markets would die.33
4. Concluding remarks
If individuals' behaviors could be observed, financial markets would offer a fruitful
arena in which to identify behavioral as opposed to fully rational individual choices. The
32Auseful parallel forfuturesmarkets mayhethe race track,withits high overheadexpenses—the statetakes mote
than 15% of total wagersin mostU.S. jurisdictions—and few winners. Some participants come for recreation.
expecting to lose. Many losers, however, believe theyhave insights and systems that give them an edge. What are
the properties of horse races thatkeep a flow of individuals andtheir monies coming to thetrack?
Theohservationthat the survivalofexpensive marketsneeds explanationcomplements the paradoxof
Grossmanand Stiglitz(1976): iimarkets are efficient, there is no incentive to gatheranyinformation; but then
bow can markets incorporate aU information to sustain efficiency?
33Zeckhauserand Niederhoffer (1983) present this insight using an ecological metaphor, likening the losing
individual investors to thegra.ssatthebottom of the foodchain,which must be replenished from outside the system
if the ecosystem is to survive. They argue further that market behavior must change over time to continue to fool
the Monday morning quamierbacks.-23-
stakesare big, the players serious, the games repeated —circumstancesthat promote rational
outcomes.
Direct verification is impossible though financial markets throw up great amounts of
data; unfortunately, most of it is aggregated, and the rivulets caused by individual investor
actions are lost beneath the waves and tides of market movements. In many instances,
sophisticated investors ("poachers) capitalize on the poor decisions of others and in so doing
restore market efficiency. A central lesson of financial economics is that the confluence of
such individual actions can guide the market back to an efficient path, so that present prices
reflect future prospects.
However, it is difficult to judge whether aggregate data themselves reflect rational
patterns. For example, there is no clear consensus in the professional literature whether
speculative bubbles reflect nonrational excesses, or rather a deviant macrophenomenon
resulting from the actions of a multitude of rational individual investors.34 A consideration of
the prospects of poaching helps identify those areas of financial activity where rational
outcomes will fail or prevail.
We advocate a fresh strategy for investigating the behavioral underpinnings of financial
phenomena: build from known traits of individual behavior to predictions about anomalies that
will appear in aggregate data. We have followed this approach here, first identifying five
behavioral traits —barn-doorclosing, expert/reliance effects, status quo bias, framing, and
herding —andthen outlining the implications for aggregate financial statistics, focusing on
financial flows. Finally, turning to the real world, we found empirical evidence from firms'
debt/equity ratios to investors' purchases of mutual funds to support our hypotheses. We hope
this demonstration will encourage others to use models of individual rionrational behavior to
elucidate financial market phenomena.
34Various observershave tried to explainspeculative bubbles withoutjettisoning the assumption of full rationality
on the part of individuals — see the discussionfromthe Symposium on Bubbles (1990). Shiller (1989) arguesthat
the evidence points to a phenomenon of investor psychology ratherthana pathological aggregation.
Future research, we believe, may take a third tack. Given the behavioral patterns that are being documented
in financial markets, what sorts of bubble behaviors and speculative excesses might we expect? Will markets be
more or less stable than they would be with full rationality? Some behavioral assumptions would increase stability,
others reduce it. For example, if individuals overreact to recent information (compared with base-rate data), the
result could be excess volatility and quite possibly destabilizing speculation. On the other hand status quo bias in
financial choices would be a force for greater stability. (Rational bubbles in several models disappear if
expectation formation is adaptive, i.e., nonrationa!.)-24-
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